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Abstract
In-work transfers are often seen as a good trade-o⁄ between redistribution and
e¢ ciency, as they alleviate poverty among low-wage households while increasing
￿nancial incentives to work. The present study explores the consequences of ex-
tending these transfers in Ireland, where support for low-wage households has been
of limited scope. The employment and poverty e⁄ects of alternative policies are an-
alyzed thanks to counterfactual simulations built using a micro-simulation model,
the Living in Ireland Survey 2001 and labour supply estimations. Firstly, we study
the e⁄ect of recent extensions of the existing scheme, the Family Income Supplement
(FIS), and of its replacement by the refundable tax credit in force in the UK. Sec-
ondly, little is known about the impact of macro-level changes on the distribution of
resources at the household level, which is particularly relevant in a country deeply
a⁄ected by the current economic downturn. We suggest a preliminary analysis of
the capacity of alternative in-work transfer scenarios to cushion the negative impact
of earnings losses and cuts in the minimum wage.
Key Words : Microsimulation; Working Poor; Welfare; Labour supply; Take-
up.
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In-work transfers, also known as ￿ Make work pay￿(MWP) policies, have been used for
many years in the US and the UK to alleviate poverty among low-wage families. These
transfers often took the form of refundable tax credits like the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC) in the US, and the various forms of the Family Tax Credit in the UK. Several
other forms of "negative taxes" also exist, including low-wage subsidies (via reductions
in social security contributions for low-wage workers) or in-work bene￿ts such as the
Family Income Supplement (FIS) in force in Ireland.1 Their appeal stems mainly from an
interesting compromise between equity and e¢ ciency. They allow redistribution to the
(working) poor, while increasing ￿nancial incentives to work for those living on welfare
payments. They are therefore a useful redistributive tool in a low unemployment context
such as that experienced by the US and UK before the crisis. In continental Europe,
poorer labour market performances but also generous social welfare programmes have
kept a substantial number of workers out of work. In this context, MWP policies have
been promoted for e¢ ciency reasons, i.e. to increase the ￿nancial gains to work and
encourage labour market participation.2
Both redistributive (or equity) and e¢ ciency arguments are relevant for the Irish case.
Yet, while ￿ making work pay￿for low-wage workers is often invoked for equity reasons,
there is probably still some way to go for the tax-bene￿t system to treat the working poor
in an equitable manner compared to other income groups. A recent article in The Irish
1Many studies address the question of MWP policies in the UK and the US and the distributional and
employment impacts of the developments of the EITC and the FC/WFTC/WTC over the past decades.
Hence we simply refer to Brewer (2001) and Blundell and Hoynes (2001) for an overview and comparison
of the US and UK systems as well as numerous additional references. For Europe, the employment e⁄ect
of the earned tax credit implemented in France is studied by Stancanelli (2008). Orsini (2006) analyze
the tax credit and wage subsidies implemented in Belgium. Some of the suggested in-work policies in
Germany (reduction of social security contributions) are analyzed by Bonin et al (2002) and the Mini-
job reform that took place is studied by Bargain et al (2009) using ex ante evaluation and by Caliendo
and Wrohlich (2006) with an ex post assessment. See also the surveys and international comparisons
by Gradus and Julsing (2001), Martin and Grubb (2001), Pearson (2001), Duncan (2002), Pearson and
Scarpetta (2002), Blundell (2000), Duncan et al. (2003), Orsini (2007) and Leppik (2006). See the more
recent discussion by Immervoll and Pearson (2009) on the role of MWP policies in times of economic
crises.
2It is noticeable that in Ireland, as in the US and the UK, these policies have been targeted essentially
at families with children. These Anglo-Saxon countries￿goal of redistribution also includes an attempt to
combat child poverty. In contrast, the motive of e¢ ciency has probably been behind the individualization
of European schemes like the wage subsidies in Germany and the earned income tax credit in France. For
continental Europe, high implicit taxation on secondary earners would be ampli￿ed by the introduction
of in-work transfers means-tested on household income (see Bargain and Orsini, 2005).
1Times noted that:
"In the run-up to the most swinging budget of the 21st century, rarely
a day passes without someone warning that ￿ the ￿nancially vulnerable￿must
be protected.[...] The impoverished workers have become the invisible vic-
tims of the recession, as they receive scant media attention." (Suzanne Kelly,
November 12, 2009: "Budget must not ignore plight of the working poor").
The e¢ ciency of the system can also be improved. The Irish Times article reports
that ￿rms have "di¢ culty engaging employees despite the recession, as the social welfare
package was, in some cases, more advantageous than wages". Extending MWP policies
may be a way to improve on both accounts. Moreover, while MWP policies, and the
double objective of increasing labour supply and income of low-wage workers, have been
particularly justi￿ed in a context of excess demand, they may also take on a new role
in times of macroeconomic shocks and constrained labour demand. This is particularly
relevant for Ireland, one of the European countries su⁄ering the most from the recent
economic recession, with rapidly increasing unemployment and wage cuts. In this context,
in-work transfers may have a cushioning e⁄ect when minimum wages are cut along with
market wages to limit the extent of classic unemployment.
Against this background, we suggest an extensive analysis of in-work transfers in Ire-
land. We consider the extension in generosity of the FIS that occurred over the last
number of years, some recently proposed reforms to the FIS stemming from the Mc-
Carthy report and the hypothetical replacement of the FIS by the British WTC. Firstly,
we analyze the e⁄ect of each alternative policy measure on employment and poverty in
Ireland, using a tax-bene￿t micro-simulation model (EUROMOD) linked to the Living
in Ireland Survey 2001 and a discrete-choice labour supply model. We are thus able to
assess the direct e⁄ects of these policies on poverty and inequality when holding mar-
ket income constant and to predict behavioural responses to policy changes and their
consequences for income distribution.3 Secondly, we consider the relative performance
of each policy in a macroeconomic environment a⁄ected by cuts in earnings and in the
minimum wage. This way, we can examine how MWP policies can cushion income losses
in a situation of economic downturn. Since lower gains to work may lead to a supply side
e⁄ect, the proposed modelling is also useful in incorporating labour supply responses into
this recessionary scenario.4 Finally, FIS is known to su⁄er from a take-up problem so we
3For Ireland, an early study by Callan et al. (2005) evaluates the FIS but there is currently no assess-
ment of the labour supply e⁄ect of this policy (or its possible extensions) using econometric techniques
nor any evaluation of the possible e⁄ects of alternative scenarios.
4According to Combat Poverty Agency (2008): "in the current climate, keeping people in employment
is as, if not more, important than getting people out of unemployment".
2investigate the e⁄ect of low take-up on the e⁄ectiveness of each policy and the sensitivity
of our results to the way take-up is introduced.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses in-work
poverty in Ireland. Section 3 presents the policies and section 4 analyses their employment
and poverty-alleviating e⁄ects. Section 5 investigates the issue of imperfect take-up.
Section 6 concludes and the Appendices describe the econometric model and the data.
2 Out-of-work and In-Work Poverty in Ireland
We ￿rst describe the phenomenon of in-work poverty in Ireland (see also Rocks, 2008).
For ease of exposition, we refer equivalently to the "poor" or those "at risk of poverty",
de￿ned as having an equivalized disposable income below 60% of the median. The working
poor are households at risk of poverty with at least one adult member in work. Using the
2004 Household Budget Survey, simple calculations show that among all those at risk of
poverty, 22% are pensioners, 51% are workless and 27% are in-work.5 In Table 1, we focus
on the group of working-age households (18-59) using two waves of the Household Budget
Survey. We observe that the proportion at risk of poverty is around 18% for both years
of data (1999 and 2004), with a substantial share of households in work (43% in 1999 and
31% in 2004).6 The proportion of working poor is particularly large among couples (56% of
poor couples in 1999 and 44% in 2004) and is mainly composed of one-earner households.
The overall decreasing trend seems to be essentially driven by this sub-group. Many
factors may explain this observation. In particular, the relative proportion of two-earner
couples has increased overall, at the expense of one-earner couples (not represented).7
This is due to the sharp increase in female participation in the labour market (see Callan
et al., 2009). Another explanation pertains to the recent evolution of the FIS which will
be discussed in the next sections.
In this context, transfers to the working poor seem to ￿ miss￿roughly two-thirds of the
overall poor among working-age households. Yet, the e⁄ect of such transfers is dynamic
since it may induce increased activity. In other words, workless poor may become working
5The most recent waves of the Irish Household Budget Survey (HBS) are for years 1994, 1999 and
2005. This data gathers information on household expenditures, incomes and socio-demographics for
around 7;000 representative households in each wave.
6When using EU-SILC 2005, 45.7% of those at risk of poverty are in work (Rocks, 2008). This ￿gure
is 32.6% when considering those consistently poor (income below the 60% median and validating at least
one of eight deprivation measures).
7One-earner couples represented 45% of all couples in 1999 and 37% in 2004, while the proportion of
no-earner couples remained stable around 11% of all couples.
3poor or escape poverty by cumulating earnings and in-work bene￿ts. It is not sure,
however, that the potential for increased labour market participation exists, either for
supply side reasons (￿nancial incentives to work) or demand side aspects. Table 2 gives
an indication of where the margin for increased labour supply was for years 1999 and 2004.
Among those out-of-work, we represent the proportion of job seekers and the proportion
of inactive persons, for instance 25 and 27% respectively among singles in 1999. The
residual category (48% for this example) is composed of all those unavailable for work,
which includes students, disabled workers or those receiving a pension. Part of the job
seekers may be seen as involuntary unemployed (classic or frictional unemployment).
The group of inactive persons, i.e., those who are not actively looking for a job, include
spouses and single mothers engaged in home duties and childcare. These groups may
be those from which increased labour supply can be expected. They are composed in
part of people who choose not to work because their low market productivity, high ￿xed
costs of work and possible tax-bene￿t disincentives make their ￿nancial gains to work
small. Very clearly, Table 2 shows that women, either single or in couples, are often in
the "inactive" category and potentially concerned by supply-side incentives. This is so
despite the dramatic increase in female labour market participation observed in the past
decades (see Callan et al., 2009). As far as child poverty is concerned, incentive e⁄ects
may be particularly important for the group of lone parent households where children face
a high risk of poverty (Cooke and Lawton, 2008).
Table 1: Working-wage Households at Risk of Poverty: In and Out of Work
all 18.5% 17.6%
All in work 7.9% 43% 5.5% 31%
out of work 10.5% 57% 12.1% 69%
in work 0.9% 21% 1.0% 16%
out of work 3.3% 79% 5.0% 84%
in work 0.8% 25% 0.8% 26%
out of work 2.3% 75% 2.3% 74%
two-earner 0.5% 56% 0.6% 44%
one-earner 5.8% 3.1% 0%
no-earner 4.9% 44% 4.8% 56%
At  risk  of  poverty  (i.e,  equivalized  disposable  income  below  60%  median)  among  working  age
households.  Own  calculation  using  Household  Budget  Survey  (HBS).  Ex:  single  parents  at  risk
of  poverty  represented  3.1  points  among  the  18.5%  of  working-age  households  at  risk  of





4Table 2: Working-age Workless Poor: Breakdown
Singles job seeker 0.8% 25% 0.8% 17%
inactive 0.9% 27% 0.8% 16%
not available 1.6% 48% 3.4% 68%
Single parents job seeker 0.2% 10% 0.1% 5%
inactive 1.7% 74% 1.9% 82%
not available 0.4% 17% 0.3% 13%
Men in couple job seeker 2.3% 40% 1.3% 24%
inactive 0.2% 3% 0.3% 6%
not available 3.4% 57% 3.7% 69%
Women in couple job seeker 0.3% 4% 0.3% 4%
inactive 8.4% 86% 5.9% 81%
not available 1.0% 10% 1.1% 15%
Working-age  households  at  risk  of  poverty  and  out  of  work,  decomposed  between  "Inactive"
(voluntarily  unemployed,  incl.  those  engaged  in  domestic  activities),  "job  seeker"  and  the  persons
unavailable  for  work  (students,  disabled  and  pensioners).
HBS2004 HBS1999
3 Policy Descriptions and Simulations
3.1 The Family Income Supplement
The Family Income Supplement (FIS) was designed to provide cash support for employees
with families on low earnings and thereby preserve the incentive to remain in employment
in circumstances where the employee might only be marginally better o⁄ than if (s)he
were claiming other social welfare payments (see Callan et al., 1995). As such, this is the
main instrument to redistribute to working poor families.8 It is a weekly payment for
families with at least one dependent child (under age 18 or 22 if in full-time education).
Claimants must be working at least 19 hours per week to qualify (though married or
cohabiting couples can add their hours together) and in an employment that is expected
to last at least three months; self-employed do not qualify. The weekly hours of spouses
and partners can be combined to meet this condition, which is not the case for the British
WTC. Denote B the income limit and Y the average weekly family income Y includes
8Other policies include the Back-to-work allowance which was discontinued in May 2009 and the
minimum wage. The Back-to-work allowance allowed people to keep a percentage of their social welfare
payment along with "secondary bene￿ts" for a period of up to three years. It was aimed at the long-term
unemployed and those on illness bene￿t. The minimum wage, which was e8:65 an hour for an experienced
adult employee from 1 July 2007 is at risk of being cut in the near future. We focus on the FIS, which has
so far escaped recommendations for its removal/reduction, since this scheme is very similar to policies
in other countries (WTC in the UK, EITC in the US), which makes it suitable for extension in these
directions or for replacement by one of those schemes (e.g., WTC).
5most transfers9 and is net of taxes and social contributions. Then:
FIS = maxf0;60%(B ￿ Y )g
The income limit B ￿and therefore the value of the bene￿t ￿varies according to the
number of children (see Table 3 below). For instance, it is EUR 590 per week in 2009 for
a family with 2 children. Hence the scheme imposes a 60% implicit marginal tax rate on
net income. FIS payment is tax free and is not counted as income when individuals are
considered for a medical card.10 This helps to reduce disincentives to seek employment.
Generally the payment continues for one year and is not a⁄ected by, for example, an
increase in earnings or other income in the family. The means test is performed at the
end of each year to determine the new payment amount for the subsequent year.
The budget curves depicted in Figure 1 and 2 illustrate the theoretical situation under
the 2001 Irish tax-bene￿t system (our baseline). For two representative households, a
single parent household (with a 9 year-old child) and a couple with two children (7 and 9
year-old children), we simulate the disposable income (i.e. original income net of all taxes
and transfers for that family) obtained at di⁄erent worked hours using the tax-bene￿t
calculator EUROMOD. For both family types, we assume wage rates equal to EUR 11:42
per hour in Figure 1 (the gross hourly earnings of an Average Production Worker, APW,
in Ireland in 2001) and EUR 5:96 per hour in Figure 2 (the minimum wage in Ireland
in 2001). We also assume there is no other source of market income than earnings. The
solid grey line represents a counterfactual scenario where the FIS is completely taken out
of the system ("no MWP"). We can observe the usual features of the Irish tax-bene￿t
system here. In particular, there is a kink point around 40 hours for the single parent
(and below 60 for the couple) when paid at the AWP, corresponding to the change of
tax bracket. Also, zero hours generally corresponds to payment of bene￿ts.11 These
social welfare payments consist of several bene￿ts for special circumstances (including
carers allowance, disabled persons maintenance allowance, deserted wives bene￿t, lone
9Exceptions are child bene￿t, early childcare supplement, carer￿ s allowance, guardian￿ s payment (con-
tributory and non-contributory), supplementary welfare allowance and foster child allowance.
10The medical card scheme allows the holder to receive certain health services free of charge. To qualify
for a medical card your weekly income must be below a certain ￿gure for your family size. Cash income
(aside from the FIS), savings, investments and property are taken into account in the means test.
11Contributory unemployment bene￿t is calculated by EUROMOD only for people who actually state
that they receive it in the data. It is not visible in the budget constraints which use hypothetical data
and assume that zero hours corresponds to long-term unemployment. Unemployment bene￿t can be kept
for work on a very temporary basis or in case of forced job-sharing. Where a person has not made enough
contributions to become eligible for unemployment bene￿t, they are eligible for unemployment assistance
(either short-term for the ￿rst 15 months of unemployment or long-term thereafter)
6parent allowance, unemployment assistance, etc.). In the case of our hypothetical budget
constraints, this is made up three components. The Supplementary Allowance acts as a
minimum income, starting at EUR 106:65 per week for a single childless person (around
EUR 464 per month) with a 100% taper rate if they have anything above zero income.
The Rent Allowance Supplement ensures that an individual￿ s income, after paying rent,
does not fall below a minimum level. This level is the basic Supplementary Welfare for
that person￿ s circumstances minus a small amount (around EUR 10 in 2001) which is
considered the minimum rent contribution the individual must make. The Lone Parent
Allowance is a means-tested payment for men and women who are bringing children up
without the support of a partner. In 2001, the ￿rst EUR 146:50 of the individual￿ s
weekly earnings was not taken into account in the means test and the withdrawal rate
thereafter was 100%. For low work duration, the phasing-out of these bene￿ts leads to
very high implicit marginal tax rates, hence the ￿ at portion of the budget constraint. In
particular, in both of the single parent graphs, there are two distinct ￿ at parts to the
budget constraint. The ￿rst corresponds to the 100% phasing out of the Rent Allowance
Supplement once income becomes positive. The second corresponds to the 100% phasing
out of the Lone Parent Allowance once the family reaches the disregard amount (of around
EUR 640 per month). This characteristic is not speci￿c to Ireland but a common feature
to all countries with some social transfers to the unemployed and workless poor (see
Bargain and Orsini, 2005). Notice, however, that replacement rates in Ireland, de￿ned as
the ratio of income out of work to income in work, are low by European standards (Callan
et al, 2008).
In comparison, the actual situation ("FIS 2001") shows only a small e⁄ect of the FIS
for workers paid at the AWP level, and the e⁄ect is focalised around part-time work. For
minimum-wage workers, on the other hand, the FIS seems to signi￿cantly increase gains
to work both part-time and full-time, especially for the one-earner couple. By increasing
disposable income to a higher level than unemployment bene￿ts, the supplement may
create incentives to participate to the labour market (Ochel 2001). However, it may also
reduce incentives to work longer hours for those in employment. The withdrawal of the
bene￿t actually corresponds to an implicit marginal taxation of 60% on net incomes (and
around 47% on gross incomes at this income level). For the couple with two children,
the phase-out of FIS actually leads to a downward sloping part of the budget constraint,
which corresponds to implicit marginal tax rates higher than 100%. These are created by
the combined withdrawal of the FIS (with a 60% taper rate) and the withdrawal of social
assistance bene￿ts as explained above. Taxation also kicks in between 20 and 30 weekly
worked hours for the one-earned couple paid at the AWP. Hence a potential risk exists of
a decrease in labour supply at the intensive margin corresponding to a decrease in worked
7Wage rate: EUR 11.42/hour

































































Figure 1: Budget Constraints for Representative Households (AWP): Baseline
Wage rate: EUR 5.96/hour

































































Figure 2: Budget Constraints for Representative Households (Minimum Wage): Baseline
hours or a move from full- to part-time work. For two-earner couples, this may also lead
to the withdrawal of the secondary earner, de￿ned as that person with the lowest wage
rate, from the labour market.12 Indeed, means-testing at the household level implies that
secondary earners may be encouraged to decrease labour supply so that the main earner
receives the maximum amount of in-work transfer. The subsequent ￿nancial loss may be
more than outweighed by an increase in non market time.
12The case of a two-earner couple where one works 40 hours and the other 20 hours, both at the same
minimum wage, corresponds to the point at 60 hours on the "one-earner couple" graph. It is clear for this
illustration that the disposable income of the household increases when the part-time secondary earner
stops working.
83.2 Evolution and Recommendations
The evolution of the parameters of the FIS between 2001 (our baseline year) and 2008
are illustrated in Table 3. Clearly, both the base payment and the child increments have
increased substantially. The former increases by roughly 50% while the latter doubles
in this seven year interval, even after allowing for purchasing power di⁄erences over the
period. We simulate this more generous FIS holding the 2001 population constant and
adjusting the 2008 monetary parameters to 2001 using CPI.
Recently, in response to the current economic crisis, several recommendations have
been made to adapt the FIS to new economic circumstances. In particular, a Commission
on Taxation was set up to reshape the whole tax-bene￿t system. Its 2009 report argues
for maintaining the level of the FIS and for keeping it tax-free, contrary to other social
welfare payments that should be subject to taxation. Also, a Special Group on Public
Service Numbers and Expenditure Programmes (or McCarthy Group) was charged with
proposing drastic cuts to public expenditure in order to reduce public debt and restore
con￿dence in the Irish economy. The latter recommended the maintenance of FIS levels
but that claimants already in receipt of a primary weekly social welfare payment should
no longer eligible for the FIS (see the report of McCarthy et al., 2009).13 We simulate
the McCarthy recommendation since a too large increase in public expenditure is not
desirable given the ￿nancial di¢ culty that the Irish exchequer is currently facing.
Table 3: Parameters of the Family Income Supplement
Family size Income limit Child increment Income limit* Real increase Child increment
1 child 328 474 45%
2 children 353 7.8% 552 56% 16.3%
3 children 378 7.2% 634 68% 14.9%
4 children 404 6.7% 735 82% 16.0%
5 children 436 7.9% 842 93% 14.5%
Withdrawal rate
Income limits are weekly and in Euro
* In 2001 prices. Source: Citizen's Information Board and Euromod 2001 policy file
60% 60%
2008 2001
13These other bene￿ts include the Carer￿ s Allowance; Illness Bene￿t; Jobseekers Bene￿t and Commu-
nity Employment schemes
93.3 Alternative System: the British Working Tax Credit
In Europe, the most prominent in-work transfer is certainly the British system of family
tax credits. For this reason, several authors have simulated the welfare and labour supply
consequences of the introduction of the British system in other countries.14 The British
Family Income Supplement, which was the model for the Irish FIS, was introduced in the
UK in 1971 and replaced in 1988 by the Family Credit (FC) which was a top-up cash
payment for low-earning couples with children. The Working Family Tax Credit (WFTC),
introduced in its stead in October 1999, was a refundable tax credit administered by the
Inland Revenue and was more generous than the previous FC. The average monthly
amount of credit increased by around 20%. The WFTC reached 1:3 million households at
a cost of $5 billion (0:6 per cent of GDP). This credit was a transfer to households with
children where at least one of the adults was in paid work (employed or self-employed) for
at least 16 hours per week. A 20% premium was given if one of the working adults worked
above 30 hours per week. Maximum entitlement also increased by 49% per dependent
child. Eligibility was based on the jointly assessed incomes of household members. Once
income reached a threshold level, the maximum amount was tapered away at a rate of 55%
on net income (versus 70% with the former FC). In 2003, a new reform split the WFTC
in two instruments with di⁄erent objectives. The ￿rst, a refundable Child Tax Credit
(CTC) to families with children, targeted the UK-speci￿c objective of reducing child
poverty (Amzat, 2006). The second, the Working Tax Credit (WTC), was essentially a
reform of the WFTC to childless households. Denote B the maximum theoretical amount,
Y the net income and ￿ a disregard, then:
WTC = B(n) ￿ max(0;55%(Y ￿ ￿)):
The WTC is for individuals who usually work 16 hours or more a week, are paid for that
work and expect to work for at least 4 weeks. To qualify, adults must be 16 or over and
responsible for at least one child; or aged 16 or over and disabled; or aged 25 or over and
usually work at least 30 hours a week. As we pointed out in the introduction, there is
a case to be made for extending MWP bene￿ts to childless individuals. Therefore, we
slightly adapt the eligibility condition for this group in our simulations so that adults
aged 16 and over are eligible whether they have a child or not.15
14See the simulation of the WFTC and an alternative individualised MWP policy in Finland, France
and Germany (Bargain and Orsini, 2005), of the WTC and CTC in Germany (Haan and Myck, 2007)
and of the implementation of family-based and individual-based MWP policies in Southern European
countries (Figari, 2009). Immervoll et al (2007) study the introduction of a US EITC-style reform on the
EU-15 countries.
15Couples with at least one child can claim the 30 hour element if they work at least 30 hours a week
between them providing at least one of them works 16 hours or more a week. Whatever work hours,
10The WTC is made up of di⁄erent elements depending on particular circumstances
of the claimant and his/her family (basic amount plus element for the presence of a
second adult, lone parent element, disability element and other elements depending on
the working hours). The taper rate of 55% on net income corresponds to around 37%
on gross income in the UK. Furthermore, the WTC program includes a speci￿c element
designed to subsidize childcare costs. However, this element is not incorporated into the
2003 EUROMOD ￿les so we disregard it. We simulate the replacement of the FIS by the
variant of the 2003 WTC described above where we apply the same hour condition to
households with and without children, that is at least 16 hours per week.16 We adjust
the monetary parameters of the 2003 reform to Ireland 2001 using Eurostat estimates of
PPP di⁄erentials.17
3.4 Simulations
The simulated scenarios are based on the 2001 Living in Ireland Survey and the EURO-
MOD simulator for that year, as described in the Appendix. The ￿rst scenario is the 2001
baseline with the 2001 version of the FIS, assuming full take-up ("FIS 2001" hereafter).
Another counterfactual is the 2001 situation where FIS is removed from the tax-bene￿t
system ("No MWP" hereafter). Reforms include the extension of the FIS to 2008 pa-
rameters ("FIS 2008"), the McCarthy recommendations ("MC" hereafter) and the joint
simulation ("MC+FIS 2008"). All of our reforms are consistent with the initial choice of
the Irish government to means-test in-work transfers on household income, rather than
on individual income as in some continental European countries. As discussed above,
this choice may allow better targeting of the population in need but may also have ad-
verse e⁄ects on hours worked and on the participation of secondary earners in couples.
Notwithstanding, while all other policy scenarios retain a MWP scheme for households
with children only, the WTC extends to the childless households (singles and couples).
The budget constraints in Figure 3 give a ￿rst glance at the reforms for the two
working persons can also claim tax credits if they are in the ￿rst year of work, having returned to work
aged at least 50 after a period of at least six months receiving out-of-work bene￿ts.
16Note that we also simulated the joint WTC and CTC system in Ireland. We found however that the
CTC component is too expensive and not very comparable to the other scenarios because the CTC is
unconditional on work. The CTC makes the joint reform eight times more expensive than just the WTC,
which is prohibitively expensive in the current economic climate.
17The entitlement of people without children is about two thirds of the potential entitlement of those
with children. They are eligible for the basic amount B = 127 pounds per month in 2003 (or EUR 194;in
2001 in our simulations) at a taper rate of 0:37 after ￿ = 422 pounds (EUR 643 in our simulations) and
the 30 hour element ($52 in 2003 or EUR 79). Those with children are entitled to another $125 (EUR
191) per month.
11illustrative households already described (single parent and couple with two children).
The starting point is the initial situation with FIS 2001. In the case where workers are
paid at the AWP, the graphs show a marked e⁄ect of the WTC around part time for single
parents and a modest increase at part time for one-earner couples. The FIS 2008 shows
a large increase in transfers compared to the 2001 situation and creates an interesting
e⁄ect at part time and above (up to 45 hours/week for one-earner couples). For low-wage
households, the e⁄ect of the reforms is more signi￿cant, as expected. WTC and FIS
2008 have comparable e⁄ects for the single parent even though the WTC starts earlier
(at 16 hours) and phases out more rapidly. The gain from FIS 2008 for a couple with
two children is substantial, but also accentuates the disincentive e⁄ects in terms of hours
for the primary earner and in terms of participation for the secondary earners. This is
also true, to a lesser extent, with the WTC. The McCarthy (MC) recommendation not
to cumulate FIS and other bene￿ts is not apparent for couples since social bene￿ts are
already fully exhausted in the income range where the FIS starts. However, for single
parents, the FIS2008/MC combination a⁄ects the net transfer by cancelling the FIS in
the income range where the parent still receives some bene￿ts, i.e., around 20 hours per
week. For low-wage single parents, this results in cancelling the in-work transfer except for
high work duration (over 42 hours per week). In practice, this combination may maintain
the disincentive e⁄ect mentioned above without generating participation e⁄ects among
low-wage single mothers.
In Table 4, we show the cost and the scope of each policy. We ￿rst present the ap-
parent cost of each MWP policy when labour supply is ￿xed at the "no MWP policy"
counterfactual situation. It is calculated as the change in total disposable income due to
the introduction of each MWP instrument, and hence accounts for possible interactions
between the policy and the rest of the system (like in the case of the MC recommenda-
tion).18 The increased generosity of FIS 2008 compared to the baseline year translates
into larger distributed amount (the average payment is more than 2:3 time that of 2001)
and a broader group of eligible households (136;000 compared to 57;000). The MC rec-
ommendation would allow a saving of around 20% of the budget allocated to in-work
transfers for both years. The scope of the WTC is broader than for FIS 2001, since it is
also available to childless households, and it is even broader than for FIS 2008. However,
distributed amounts are similar to FIS 2001 on average.
18The apparent cost of the FIS is in line with o¢ cial ￿gures (available on www.welfare.ie) once we
account for the low take-up rate of around 33%. In e⁄ect, the cost of the FIS is estimated at EUR 37
million in 2001 and EUR 170 million in 2008, which is close to a third of the costs shown in Table 4 for
FIS 2001 and FIS 2008. A third of the number of eligible households, just under 20,000, is overestimated
compared to the actual number of receiving households, around 14,000 in year 2001.
12Wage rate: EUR 11.42/hour
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Figure 3: Budget Constraints with Reforms (AWP)
It is possible to compare the apparent cost of the reform, i.e., calculated when holding
labour supply constant, to the real cost including potential labour supply adjustments.
As shall be seen, the overall e⁄ect of the suggested reforms on labour supply is negative,
and especially so in the case of the FIS 2008. This is in line with our expectations from
inspecting the hypothetical budget constraints. Since the tax base decreases (e¢ ciency
loss) and in-work transfer payments increase in response to the reforms, the real cost is
thus expected to be higher than the apparent cost. The di⁄erence is particularly large
in the case of the FIS 2008, whose real cost increases by 35% due to labour supply
responses.19 Since these adjustments are aimed at making the household eligible for the
in-work transfer, it is logical that the number of eligible households increases following
the response, as well as the average amount of the transfer.
4 E⁄ects of the Reforms
4.1 Labour Supply E⁄ects
Table 5 presents the labour simulation based on the model described in the Appendix and
on the assumption of 100% take-up of in-work transfers. Actual take-up rates of the FIS
are in fact relatively modest so the present analysis, as well as the cost analysis in the
previous section, are theoretical. The assumption of full take-up is made to compare the
full potential of the reforms. In the next section, we shall investigate how the distributional
19Note that we do not attempt to make the reforms of equal cost since FIS 2001 and 2008 are the
actual policies and the WTC is adapted from the policy in force in the UK. However, we calculate the
change in VAT that makes each policy revenue neutral, as reported in Table 4.
13Wage rate: EUR 5.96/hour
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Figure 4: Budget Constraints with Reforms (Minimum Wage)







Cost (million Euro per year) * 102 565 80 456 256
in % GDP 0.09% 0.48% 0.07% 0.39% 0.22%
Cost (million Euro per year) ** 128 769 103 617 330
in % GDP 0.1% 0.7% 0.1% 0.5% 0.3%
Flat tax 0.3% 1.8% 0.2% 1.5% 0.8%
No. of eligible hh * 57,124 135,970 40,168 113,551 147,666
No. of eligible hh ** 62,812 159,933 44,431 131,802 164,506
in proportion of total pop. 5% 12% 3% 10% 13%
Average amount (Euro, per month) * 148 346 166 334 144
Average amount (Euro, per month) ** 169 401 193 390 167
** After LS adjustment to the policy
We  assume  100%  take-up  for  all  reforms.  FIS:  Family  Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's
report;  WTC:  2003  British  Working  Tax  Credit.  For  reforms  including  the  MC  recommendations,  we  count  as  eligible
those  families  who  still  receive  an  in-work  transfers.
* With labout supply as in no MWP situation
14impact of the di⁄erent policies changes under di⁄erent take-up assumptions and how
sensitive it is to the nature of the households who may take up the transfer among all
eligible households. Since labour supply estimates may also change depending on the
nature of take-up behaviour, we present a robustness analysis in the Appendix based
on various assumptions (full take-up, no take-up, actual take-up in 2001 with a a joint
estimation of labour supply and claiming decisions).
Table 5 reports labour supply responses compared to the "no MWP policy" counter-
factual situation for which labour supply choices are also predicted. Against this reference
point, we simulate the change in average worked hours and participation rates for single
men, single women and men and women in couples separately. Since positive participation
e⁄ects may correspond to the take-up of a part-time job, we also express the total change
in hours in terms of "full-time equivalent" jobs (FTE). Even under a full-take assumption,
Table 5 shows that the FIS 2001 has a very small e⁄ect on labour supply. The FIS 2008,
however, has a strong negative e⁄ect on couples, as anticipated above. Withdrawals from
the labour market concern secondary earners in particular with the participation rate of
married women decreasing by 1:2 points. The hours reduction in FTE is larger than the
participation e⁄ect in number of workers, which re￿ ects the fact that there is, in addition
to the response at the extensive margin, a signi￿cant decrease in work hours. This e⁄ect is
strong for both women and men in couples. In contrast, the policy has a very strong pos-
itive e⁄ect on single mothers, a particularly vulnerable population subgroup, seen in the
"single women" group. While the participation rate in this group increases by around 10
points, the FTE e⁄ect is more modest, which implies that most of the extensive response
corresponds to part-time activity. Overall, the e⁄ect of the FIS 2008 on participation is
positive but it is negative when considering total working time.
As suggested in the previous section, the MC recommendation does not change the
e⁄ect on couples obtained with the FIS, but considerably reduces the positive participa-
tion e⁄ect on single mothers. That is, compared to the FIS2008 situation, the MC reform
could create a disincentive e⁄ect for people entitled to both social welfare and the FIS be-
fore the reform. Once they lose their entitlement to the FIS because they are in receipt of
social welfare, they might simply drop out of the labour market. Compared to FIS 2008,
the MC reform reduces the hour e⁄ect in FTE for single mothers but not as much as the
participation e⁄ect, suggesting that those who would take up a job under FIS2008+MC
would opt for full-time (or overtime) activity. Nonetheless, we can expect that this con-
cerns the better-o⁄ within the lone parent group, so that the anti-poverty e⁄ect of FIS
2008 could be seriously reduced when combined with the MC recommendations.
Finally, the WTC shows contrasting e⁄ects. For couples, the negative e⁄ect at the
intensive margin seems to dominate, while a strong e⁄ect on the participation of single
15mothers can be observed. Yet the latter corresponds to part-time activity ￿as anticipated
by the budget graphs. Since the WTC is extended to childless households, we also notice
a modest participation e⁄ect on single men, dominated by a reduction in work duration
for those in the phase-out area of the scheme.
These results are in line with the ￿ndings of Blundell et al. (2000) for the UK, who ￿nd
a mitigated e⁄ect of the extension of the Family Credit in 1999 (the WFTC reform) on
employment. This was due to the combination of increased labour market participation
of lone parents, and to a lesser extent of men, partially o⁄set by a reduction in the hours
supplied and a very signi￿cant drop in the participation of female secondary earners.
A few ex post evaluations are available. Blundell et al. (2000) suggest a di⁄erence-in-
di⁄erence analysis as a ￿rst check of the ex ante evaluation. More recently, Francesconi
and Van der Klauuw (2007) studied the e⁄ect of the 1999 WFTC on single women using
panel data. They ￿nd even larger positive responses by lone mothers, and a more diverse
picture across responses, than in ex ante evaluations.20 An interesting exercise, close to
that suggested here, is proposed by Brewer et al. (2006). Using a structural model, the
authors simulate the e⁄ect of completely removing the WFTC from the British system
(year 2002). They ￿nd that without any form of in-work bene￿t in the UK, labour force
participation by lone mothers would decrease by 11 percentage points ￿this is of the
order of magnitude of what we ￿nd for the FIS 2008 and the WTC compared to the "no
MWP policy" situation. They also ￿nd that withdrawing the tax credit would decrease
the participation of men in couples by 1:1 points and increase that of women in couples
by 0:73: We are not aware of any labour supply evaluation of the 2003 WTC in the UK,
which would be more directly comparable with the reform simulated here. Brewer and
Clark(2003) note however that the incentives created by the WTC are not universal. The
incentive to enter work is high for the ￿rst earner in a family but lower for second earners.
The bene￿t withdrawal rate also generates high implicit marginal taxation and hence hour
reductions.
20In the mid 80￿ s, the US preceded other countries in reforming the welfare system by increasing the
generosity of its EITC, which resulted in a substantial increase in the labour supply of single mothers
with young children.









Women  in  couples
Participation rate 0.609 0.607 0.597 0.607 0.597 0.607
Hours 19.6 19.4 18.7 19.4 18.7 19.4
(0.46) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47) (0.44) (0.47)
participation change -383 -3,441 -383 -3,430 -383
hour change in FTE -1,183 -6,775 -1,183 -6,752 -1,669
Men  in  couples
Participation rate 0.928 0.928 0.925 0.928 0.925 0.926
Hours 38.7 38.6 37.8 38.6 37.8 38.5
(0.50) (0.54) (0.49) (0.54) (0.49) (0.54)
participation change -62 -964 -62 -957 -737
hour change in FTE -1,355 -6,827 -1,355 -6,789 -1,848
Single  women  (incl.  lone  mothers)
Participation rate 0.732 0.748 0.829 0.735 0.756 0.803
Hours 23.7 23.9 25.7 23.6 24.9 24.2
(1.29) (1.15) (1.00) (1.29) (1.19) (1.03)
participation change 1,644 9,619 326 2,417 7,008
hour change in FTE 678 5,084 -34 3,032 1,386
Single  men
Participation rate 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.757 0.764
Hours 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 28.2 27.6
(1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.06) (1.11)
participation change 0 0 0 0 696
hour change in FTE 0 0 0 0 -1,477
Total
participation change 1,198 5,214 -119 -1,971 6,585
hour change in FTE -1,859 -8,518 -2,571 -10,508 -3,608
We  assume  100%  take-up.  FTE:  full-time  equivalent  (change  in  number  of  FTE  workers  compared  to  no  MWP  scenario).  FIS:  Family
Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's  report;  WTC:  2003  British  Working  Tax  Credit.  Bootstrapped
standard  errors  for  work  hours  are  in  brackets  (and  available  from  the  authors  for  other  statistics).
174.2 Redistributive E⁄ects on 2001 Baseline
Ireland has one of the highest ￿at risk of poverty￿rates in the EU (Callan et al, 2008).21
Table 5 reports simulation results regarding the anti-poverty e⁄ects of the policies being
studied, evaluated against the "no MWP policy" counterfactual on the 2001 baseline.
Here too, the e⁄ects are hypothetical in the sense that they correspond to a 100% take-up
scenario. Nonetheless, this gives an interesting picture of the redistributive potential of
each instrument. We ￿rst focus on the headcount ratio of poverty, FGT(0). All the reforms
have a modest but signi￿cant e⁄ect on poverty when placing the poverty line at 50% of
the median equivalized income. As expected, the FIS 2008 has the largest e⁄ect, almost
twice the size of FIS 2001. With a poverty line at 60% of the median, however, the e⁄ect
of the FIS 2008 is much larger than other reforms, which re￿ ects the fact that the "new"
FIS bene￿ts households just below 60% of the median in an important way. It is therefore
not surprising that the FIS 2008, just like the other policies, has a moderate e⁄ect on the
intensity of poverty, measured by the poverty gap FGT(1). More interestingly, the labour
supply responses generated by the FIS 2008 double the anti-poverty e⁄ect with a poverty
line at 50% median. This could be due to a combination of negative responses (which
increase disposable income when the budget curve is decreasing because of FIS 2008) and
positive responses in the case of single mothers, a group particularly at risk of poverty.
The poverty alleviation is also large when the MC reform is added to FIS 2008, but not
of the same magnitude, illustrating that the positive e⁄ect on single mothers, strongly
reduced in this case, is an important component of the redistributive e⁄ect of the FIS.
The e⁄ect of the WTC is similar to that of FIS 2008 but with a magnitude of around
two-thirds at the 50% poverty line and slightly smaller at the 60% poverty line.22
4.3 Redistributive E⁄ects after Income Shock
In a period of economic downturn, MWP policies may also have a role and cushion income
losses caused by reduced working hours or wage cuts for those in employment. On the
one hand, they may play a part in increasing ￿ exibility in the labour market. Indeed, in a
context of constrained labour demand, recent public policies have suggested work sharing
as a margin of adjustment for ￿rms and the use of state transfers to secure incomes of
21With a poverty rate of 24:5% in the FIS 2001 situation, we slightly overestimate poverty compared
to o¢ cial ￿gures of around 22:1% (Nolan et al., 2002). For child poverty, our simulations are very close
to the 25% found in o¢ cial reports. Note that at-risk-of-poverty rates (using 60% median) are lower in
Section 2 because we focus there on working-age households only.
22In the UK, anyone receiving the WTC who has a child is also entitled to the very generous CTC.
Using the WTC on its own as a reform therefore limits the anti-poverty e⁄ect. Brewer and Clark (2003)
show that the CTC is more e⁄ective in reducing poverty than the WTC.
18Table 6: Poverty Impact of the Reforms






Static  Poverty  Analysis
FGT(0), pov. line = 50% median .174 .170 .166 .170 .166 .169
change -2.5% -4.9% -2.5% -4.8% -3.2%
FGT(0), pov. line = 60% median .247 .245 .225 .245 .227 .241
change -0.6% -8.8% -0.7% -8.1% -2.5%
FGT(1), pov. line = 50% median .0341 .0334 .0340 .0333 .0339 .0337
change -1.9% -0.2% -2.2% -0.6% -1.1%
FGT(1), pov. line = 60% median .0630 .0620 .0607 .0619 .0608 .0616
change -1.6% -3.6% -1.7% -3.5% -2.2%
Poverty:  with  Labour  Supply  Response
FGT(0), pov. line = 50% median .174 .169 .156 .170 .161 .163
change -3.0% -10.7% -2.5% -7.6% -6.7%
FGT(0), pov. line = 60% median .247 .245 .217 .245 .224 .235
change -0.6% -12.1% -0.5% -9.2% -4.9%
FGT(1), pov. line = 50% median .0341 .0328 .0308 .0327 .0323 .0315
change -3.7% -9.6% -3.9% -5.2% -7.4%
FGT(1), pov. line = 60% median .0630 .0614 .0564 .0614 .0588 .0587
change -2.6% -10.4% -2.6% -6.7% -6.8%
We  assume  100%  take-up  for  all  reforms.  FIS:  Family  Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's  report;
WTC:  2003  British  Working  Tax  Credit.  Poverty  measures  are  based  on  equivalized  disposable  income  (using  the  modified
OECD  scale).
19workers forced to (or opting for) partial unemployment. Arguably, using MWP policies to
cushion income losses is better than traditional unemployment bene￿ts as it is not based
on employment history and is available to anyone who passes the means-test (Immervoll
and Pearson, 2009).23 On the other hand, MWP policies may also have a cushioning e⁄ect
when earnings drop and minimum wages are cut.24 This is particularly relevant in the
Irish context where cuts in public wages, accompanied by a cut in the national minimum
wage, have been announced to match recent drops in private sectors earnings to avoid
pushing up classic unemployment.25 Analyses of the e⁄ect of macroeconomic shocks of
that type at the microeconomic level and on the distribution of disposable income are
rarely available or are often backward looking. Here, we suggest the analysis of a simple
uniform cut in earnings and in the Irish national minimum wage of 10% in real terms.
This magnitude is justi￿ed by o¢ cial ￿gures, suggesting a cut of 4￿5% in real terms for
the 2007-2008 period, and the reasonable assumption of a similar drop for the 2008-09
period.
Table 7 ￿rst shows that in the baseline scenario the poverty rate with a relative poverty
line at 60% of the median is not very di⁄erent from that obtained when freezing the poverty
line at 60% of the median of the "no MWP" scenario. Using this absolute poverty line,
we con￿rm that the poverty alleviation by "FIS 2001" is modest. Thanks to "FIS 2008",
around 12:6% of the poor cross the absolute poverty line. Only three-quarters of this
is achieved when MC recommendations are in place and roughly half when using the
WTC. When real earnings decrease by 10%, poverty increases by 7:6% in the "no MWP"
scenario compared to the "pre-crisis" and "no MWP" absolute poverty line. In this crisis
context, the poverty alleviation of the di⁄erent MWP policies compared to the "no MWP"
situation is similar to above. Yet, it is noticeable that the increase in poverty is cushioned
only by the FIS 2008. Absolute poverty increases by "only" 5:1% in this case. Note that
our simulation in this section accounts for labour supply responses. We ￿nd in particular
that the drop in earnings reduces the labour supply of married women (men) by 4% (1%)
23We do not follow this path as simulating unemployment shocks realistically requires more sophisti-
cated models of both labour demand and supply, which are rarely made available together with tax-bene￿t
simulations (an exception is Dolls et al., 2009). For work sharing policies, as recently implemented in
Germany, see the discussion in Immervoll and Pearson (2009) and the simulation in Bargain et al. (2010).
24Note that the present study suggests one of the ￿rst simulations of how alternative tax-bene￿t
systems perform in reducing poverty/inequality in a recessionary context (see also Feres et al., 2002, on
the sensitivity of social inclusion indicators to an increase in unemployment and an increase in earnings
inequality). MWP policies may also act as automatic stabilisers in a credit constrained environment (see
Dolls et al., 2009, and Mabbett, 2004, on the automatic stabilisation e⁄ects of tax-bene￿t systems in the
EU).
25More generally, and as discussed in the introduction, in-work transfers may be preferred to minimum
wages to support low-wage workers without introducing market distortions.
20and of single women (men) by 5% (4%). This is explained by the fact that work does not
pay as much in our recessionary scenario, while welfare payments have not been changed.
These e⁄ects are important as they could cumulate to increased unemployment due to
the demand-side of the labour market.
Another important contribution is the e⁄ect of the suggested policies on speci￿cally
vulnerable groups. In particular, table 8 shows that the risk of poverty among single
mothers is very high in Ireland. We observe that under the full take-up assumption, the
FIS 2008 has an extremely large impact as it could reduce poverty among single parents
by 36% in absolute terms i.e. when freezing the poverty line at 60% of the median of
the "no MWP" scenario. These ￿gures combine the direct e⁄ect of the transfer and the
positive labour supply e⁄ect of the FIS that brings many of these single parent households
above the (absolute) poverty line. As discussed before, the MC recommendations may
seriously limit the incentive e⁄ect of the FIS 2008 and subsequently reduce the poverty
alleviation in this group. Indeed absolute poverty is decreased by only 10% in this case.
Note that these must a⁄ect the ￿gures presented above for the total population only by
a small amount since the group of single mothers is relatively small. In a recessionary
situation, only the FIS 2001 and 2008 show interesting cushioning roles: under the FIS
2001 (2008), poverty increases by only 4:3% (2:8%) compared to the around 8% increase
in a "no MWP" situation.
In-work bene￿ts and tax credits in Anglo-Saxon countries (FIS, WTC, EITC) have
been targeted at low-wage families with children since one of the policy objectives is
to combat child poverty. In Ireland, the FIS is clearly viewed as an instrument for this
purpose, as illustrated by recent claims of certain groups (the ￿ End Child Poverty￿coalition
and the OPEN ￿ representing lone parents groups in Ireland￿ ) to increase the FIS. Table
8 shows that around a quarter of Irish children live in families with equivalized incomes
below 60% of the median. Again, the poverty alleviation of the FIS 2008 is extremely
strong, decreasing child poverty in a "no MWP" world by 42%. This e⁄ect is reduced
by the MC reform but nowhere as much as in the case of single parent households. This
is because poor children found in two-parent families are not as penalized by the MC
measure, as seen the budget constraints. The FIS 2008 also performs well in cushioning
the income loss among households with children. The WTC, on the other hand, does not
particularly reduce child poverty ￿even though it would lift a quarter of single mother
households above the absolute poverty line in the baseline situation.26
26In the UK, policy makers have acknowledged the fact that attaining three policy objectives ￿increased
labour supply, improved ￿nancial circumstances of low-wage workers, and combating child poverty ￿with
a single policy instrument is a di¢ cult task, hence the splitting of the Working Family Tax Credit into
a refundable Child Tax Credit and a Working Tax Credit extended to childless households. In Ireland,
21Table 7: Redistributive E⁄ects of MWP Policies: Income Shocks







FGT(0), pov. line = 60% median .247 .245 .217 .245 .224 .235
FGT(0), pov. line = fixed* .247 .245 .216 .246 .223 .235
No. of poor household (60% median) 317,224 315,223 277,224 316,181 286,851 301,550
change compared to "no MWP" -2,000 -40,000 -1,042 -30,373 -15,674
change (%) -0.6% -12.6% -0.3% -9.6% -4.9%
FGT(0), pov. line = fixed* .265 .262 .227 .263 .235 .252
change compared to "no MWP" -1.4% -14.6% -0.9% -11.4% -5.2%
change compared to baseline 2001 +7.6% +6.7% +5.1% +7.0% +5.4% +7.3%
*  Poverty  line  frozen  at  60%  median  income  of  2001  "no  MWP"  scenario.
We  assume  100%  take-up  for  all  reforms.  FIS:  Family  Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's  report;  WTC:  2003
British  Working  Tax  Credit
All  market  incomes  and  minimum  wage  cut  by  10%
Table 8: Redistributive E⁄ects of MWP Policies: Speci￿c Groups







FGT(0), pov. line = fixed* .522 .507 .332 .523 .468 .389
            change compared to "no MWP" -3% -36% 0% -10% -25%
FGT(0), pov. line = fixed*, income cut** .562 .529 .342 .558 .506 .415
            change compared to baseline 2001 +7.8% +4.3% +2.8% +6.9% +8.1% +6.7%
Child  poverty
FGT(0), pov. line = fixed* .247 .243 .144 .244 .162 .224
            change compared to "no MWP" -2% -42% -1% -34% -9%
FGT(0), pov. line = fixed*, income cut** .284 .275 .157 .278 .179 .258
            change compared to baseline 2001 +15.1% +13.3% +9.3% +14.1% +10.2% +15.3%
*  Poverty  line  frozen  at  60%  median  income  of  2001  "no  MWP"  scenario.
**  All  market  incomes  and  minimum  wage  cut  by  10%
We  assume  100%  take-up  for  all  reforms.  FIS:  Family  Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's  report;  WTC:  2003
British  Working  Tax  Credit
225 Take-up Issues
Previous results show the theoretical e⁄ects of various policies under the assumption of
full take-up. However, the take-up rate of the Irish FIS is relatively low. Reforms in
the 90￿ s extended the multiplier (taper rate) from 50% to 60%, increased the maximum
earning ceiling and changed the basis for assessment of the supplement from gross earnings
to earnings after taxes and social contributions. As a consequence the number of working
families receiving a bene￿t has increased. Campaigns aiming at raising awareness of
the employment incentive aspect of the scheme were carried out, most recently in 2005.
Publicly available estimations indicate that around 30￿40% of potential bene￿ciaries in
earlier years actually applied for FIS (Stephens 2005, Combat Poverty, 2008). A signi￿cant
rise in the number of recipients has occurred since 2003, generally attributed to the in￿ ow
of foreign nationals, who were eligible for the bene￿t, but also to the increased generosity
as simulated in our FIS 2008 scenarios (see Sweeney, 2007).
The Irish situation compares unfavourably to the UK system, where the take-up of the
WTC during the 2006-07 ￿nancial year was estimated at 54￿57% of entitled households
(HM Revenue and Customs Analysis Team, 2006). This higher, if imperfect, take-up rate
may be partly due to the choice of a refundable tax credit instead of an in-work bene￿t.
In the UK too, in-work bene￿ts conditional on claims posed serious take-up problems
in the past. In recent years, policy makers opted for tax credits administered by ￿scal
authorities and paid directly through the wage packet in Paid As Your Earn systems.27
Hence, automatic payment and other administrative aspects may be crucial in the success
of these policies to actually reduce poverty and encourage labour supply. 28
Another di¢ culty is that it is very di¢ cult to measure take-up at the micro level. In
other words, while it is possible to compare the o¢ cial number of recipients to the number
of theoretically eligible households (as simulated in this paper), it is more of an issue to
characterize the exact status of each households in available microdata. This is mainly
reforms of the income-tested child income support (￿Child dependent allowance￿ ) have been advocated
(Combat Poverty, 2006), as well as a radical reform that would combine these allowances and the FIS
into a ￿second tier￿child bene￿t (see the analysis in Callan et al., 2006).
27The WFTC reform of 1999 immediately reduced the stigma associated with claiming the bene￿t as
this change helped the WFTC to be associated with work and not social welfare. The latest version, the
2003 WTC, has a signi￿cantly higher take-up rate than any previous similar system of in-work support.
Other problems have nonetheless occurred, particularly ￿ aws in the administration of the WTC-CTC,
problems of overpayments and underpayments, error and fraud, employer compliance costs, etc. (see
Cooke and Lawton, 2008).
28Many administrative issues may a⁄ect the e⁄ectiveness of a policy, in particular the form of payment,
its frequency, the degree of administrative hassle to claim the bene￿t, etc. (see Duncan et al., 2003, and
Dilnot and McCrae, 1999).
23due to the underreporting of bene￿t receipt in interview-based surveys such as the Living
in Ireland data (see Appendix B). While previous sections give a clear picture of the
redistributive and (dis)incentive potentials of the alternative policies under the full take-
up assumption, we investigate here the sensitivity of the anti-poverty e⁄ect of each policy
to the nature of the recipients. Acknowledging the non-representativeness of the recipients
in our dataset, due to under-reporting of the FIS, we choose recipient households randomly
among those deemed eligible for the policy according to our simulation, assuming a take-
up rate of a third, and calculate the 95% con￿dence intervals for the poverty measures
over a large number of draws. The simulation of FIS 2001 show that the 5% bound is
close to the full take-up scenario but that the 95% bound is equivalent to the "no MWP
policy" case, that is, we pick the richer among the FIS eligible families and the FIS has
no e⁄ect. For all policies, applying the 33% take-up rate reduces poverty alleviation as
expected, and the poverty alleviation e⁄ect becomes insigni￿cant for the FIS 2001. It
remains signi￿cant for FIS 2008 and the WTC but can be very small. Only the FIS 2008
shows a poverty reduction up to ￿4:1% in the best case and ￿1:6% at worst.
Table 9: Take-up: Sensitivity Analysis






full take-up .241 .238 .218 .238 .221 .234
low take-up 5% .241 .239 .231 .239 .232 .237
(conf. interval) 95% .241 .237 .241 .237 .240
change 5% -0.6% -4.1% -0.6% -3.6% -1.4%
(conf. interval) 95% 0.0% -1.6% 0.0% -1.6% -0.4%
All  measures  are  FGT(0),  with  poverty  line  frozen  at  60%  median  income  of  2001  "no  IWB"  scenario.  Measures  for  low-
take  up  are  bootstrapped  over  200  draws  of  the  33%  recipients  (official  take-up  rate)  among  all  eligible.
6 Conclusion
Combating poverty while maintaining high work incentives is a reasonable mix of policy
objectives that has been adopted in most industrialized countries. This paper suggests a
series of simulation exercises to analyze the e⁄ectiveness of alternative "make work pay"
policies in Ireland. We focus on the ability of these policies to reduce poverty in a baseline
situation or when income shocks, re￿ ecting the current economic downturn, occur. We
￿nd that the evolution of the existing scheme, the Family Income Supplement, over the
2001-2008 period could signi￿cantly reduce poverty. The e⁄ect is not only due to direct
24poverty alleviation among the working population but also to the incentive e⁄ect among
certain groups at risk of poverty, in particular single parent households. The e⁄ects are
more modest when accounting for the fact that take-up is low in Ireland, particularly
when compared to that of closest neighbours, the UK. However, the FIS 2008 still has a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on poverty reduction, whatever the nature of the recipients within the
eligible population.
Exporting the British Working Tax Credit to Ireland with minor modi￿cations seems
to allow for a broad coverage and could possibly increase take-up if the bene￿t becomes
an automatic (refundable) tax credit paid through the pay package as in the UK.29 The
redistributive e⁄ect is smaller than with FIS 2008 because the incentive e⁄ect among
single mothers is much lower and encourages mainly part-time activity This may not be
enough to take them out of poverty.30 The recent recommendation of the McCarthy group
may prove more cost e¢ cient but could cancel out most of the poverty reduction among
single mothers.
Married women make up a signi￿cant potential margin of increased labour supply
in Ireland, despite the already dramatic increase in female participation over the past
decades. Yet the policies analyzed in this study have, for the most part, a disincentive
e⁄ect on this group because of the means-test at the household level. This is a feature of
the existing FIS that we have retained for the alternative policies under investigation but
other paths to reform are possible. The trade-o⁄, however, is that a more individualized
scheme would be less targeted at low-income households. More simulations are required
to assess what the most e¢ cient policy would be in the Irish context, provided that we
learn what the policy objectives or the true social preferences are. As often, the devil is in
the details and the speci￿c features of a reform matter.31 Looking at the other elements
29The risk of adverse e⁄ects, i.e., a decrease in market wage by ￿rms, exists but may be partly covered
by the relatively high minimum wage in force in Ireland.
30The choice of the correct instrument ultimately depends on social preferences and the relative weights
put by the government on the e¢ ciency objective (increasing work incentives and labour market partic-
ipation), the equity objective (reducing inequality and poverty) and other speci￿c objectives (reducing
child poverty). While we focus on non-welfarist objectives in the present paper, Bargain and Keane
(2009) also show that substantial in-work transfers can be justi￿ed by the maximization of a welfarist
social welfare function under reasonable (estimated) elasticities and for consistent social preferences ￿in
particular, this allows justifying the extension of MWP policies to childless households, as done in the
UK since 2003, and suggest here for Ireland.
31Should the transfer be phased in and phased out and at what levels? Should it be conditional on the
wage rate or on earnings? Should it be designed at the individual level or at the household level etc? This
design process must naturally account for ￿ framework conditions￿ , i.e. the speci￿c setting in which the
instrument will be introduced which may in￿ uence the e⁄ect of the reform and its chances of success. For
instance, an important initial condition is the shape of the wage/earnings distribution, which in￿ uences
25of the existing system is also necessary, in particular the interaction of FIS with the One
Parent Family Payment
In terms of methodology, ex ante analyses rely on a certain number of assumptions
concerning household behaviour and rationality. More systematic comparison with ex
post analyses is required (see Blundell et al., 2000), although this is made di¢ cult by the
rarity of data that allows researchers to capture this e⁄ect and the problem of ￿nding
convincing control groups. Since take-up is an issue in the context of the Irish FIS, larger
datasets identifying recipients and allowing an assessment of eligibility are necessary in
order to measure and understand the nature of non-take-up. More qualitative studies may
also reveal some of the reasons behind non-take-up and suggest further paths to reform
in order to extend the scope of the FIS (see DSFA, 2008).
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29Appendix A: Empirical Approach
Labour Supply Model and Simulation
We use a discrete choice model of labour supply to predict the behavioural response to
actual and hypothetical reforms, as suggested by van Soest (2005). Consumption-leisure
preferences are speci￿ed using a quadratic utility function, as in Blundell et al. (2000).
Coe¢ cients on consumption and leisure vary linearly with several taste-shifters (age, age
and number of children, Dublin). Costs of work are also accounted for to increase the
￿ exibility of the model. Consumption (equivalent to disposable income in a static frame-
work) is calculated for each discrete hour choice on the basis of individual earnings (with
observed wages for workers and predicted wages for non-workers), household unearned
income and socio-demographic characteristics, using a tax-bene￿t microsimulation calcu-
lator, EUROMOD. The latter allows the computation of all social contributions, direct
taxes and transfers to yield household disposable income (see Bargain, 2006 ed.). It is
also used to simulate the actual and hypothetical reforms analyzed in this paper. EU-
ROMOD is an integrated tax-bene￿t calculator covering the systems of EU-15 countries.
We use the simulation of the 2001 Irish system combined to the Living in Ireland data
for the same year. The Irish module within EUROMOD replicates exactly the simulation
of the Irish national model SWITCH for that year. We have also programmed the 2008
version of FIS, the reform following the suggestion of the McCarthy report and used the
EUROMOD module for the UK to adapt the British Working Tax Credit to the Irish
system.
Data and Sample Selection
The data are drawn from the Living in Ireland Survey (LII) for the year 2001. This is
a representative sample containing information on household demographics, employment
and incomes, among other things. The original sample consists of just over 11;436 indi-
viduals in 3;463 households. The reforms are simulated on the complete representative
sample. However, labour supply is estimated (and behavioural responses predicted) only
on selected subgroups of couples, single men and single women (possibly with children).
For that purpose we only keep households where adults are aged between 18 and 59 and
available for the labour market, i.e. neither disabled nor retired nor in education. The
self-employed and farmers are excluded as their labour supply decisions are probably very
di⁄erent from those of salary workers. To further increase data homogeneity, ￿ extreme￿
households are selected out, i.e. very large households, those where children also work,
and those who receive important levels of capital income. Descriptive statistics of the
30selected samples are presented in Table 10 while the distributions of actual worked hours
for males and females in all three samples are depicted in Figure 5. The pattern of hours
presents strong concentrations around full time activity and small concentrations around
part-time (especially for women), which convey that the choice of a discrete-choice model
is well adapted to the Irish case. We make use of a simple discretization with J = 4 for
singles and J = 16 for couples, with choices being 0;20;40 and 50 hours per week.
Table 10: Descriptive Statistics
Single men Single women Men in couple Women in couple
Age 38.6 37.1 40.8 38.9
Upper secondary education (%) 0.27 0.31 0.30 0.38
University education (%) 0.21 0.26 0.25 0.26
Wage rate* 10.5 10.0 14.9 11.3
Worked hours (incl. zeros) 28.6 24.2 37.7 19.1
Participation rate (%) 0.75 0.76 0.93 0.62
No. of children 0.10 0.79
Presence of children 0-2 (%) 0.01 0.10
Living in Dublin (%) 0.26 0.33
No. of observations 183 168
*Wages are in euro/hour, calculated using earnings and worked hours for workers and predicted for non-workers.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Working Time
31Labour Supply Estimations
Predicted elasticities are reported in table 11.32 With the non-linear model used, they are
obtained by simulating the impact of a marginal increase in gross hourly wages on hours of
work and participation.33 Results are in line with other ￿ndings for Ireland (Doris, 2001,
Callan and van Soest, 1996, Callan et al., 2009) and with the broad range of empirical
￿ndings of labour supply elasticities for other countries (see Blundell and Macurdy, 1999).
We ￿nd own-wage elasticities of around 0:40 for women in couples and 0:11 for men in
couples (with standard 95 per cent con￿dence intervals of 0:31 ￿ 0:46 and 0:08 ￿ 0:13
respectively). Cross-wage elasticities for women and men in couples are ￿0:09 and ￿0:05
respectively. For single individuals, there seem to be no marked di⁄erences between men
and women, with elasticities around 0:37 for men and 0:43 for women. The precision
of the estimation for singles is not as good as for couples. For both single individuals
and individuals in couples, we also ￿nd that most of the sensitivity of labour supply for
wage rates is driven by changes in the decision to participate. Elasticities do not seem
to have changed radically over time. Using data for 1987, Callan and van Soest (1996)
￿nd elasticities of about 0:67 and 0:15 for married women and men respectively. Income
elasticity is also simulated by increasing unearned income by 1% (and bottom-coding for
those with zero unearned income). We ￿nd that income elasticity is marginal, as usually
reported in the literature.
Appendix B: Robustness Check
Our baseline estimate assumes full take-up and hence is consistent with the policy simu-
lations in the paper. The implicit assumption made there is that reforms also guarantee
full take-up of the MWP policy. However, we have performed some robustness checks by
32Labour supply estimation are not reported here but are available from the authors. They show usual
results, notably the fact that children signi￿cantly decrease the propensity to work for women (both
women in couples and single mothers). Taste shifters related to age are signi￿cant only for single men
and women in couples. Costs of work are signi￿cantly positive for men and single women. Pseudo-R2
are :26 (couples), :25 (single women) and :29 (single men).
33We follow a calibration method which is consistent with the probabilistic nature of the model at the
individual level. It consists of drawing a set (here 200 draws) of J + 1 random terms from the EV ￿ I
distribution for each household that generates a perfect match between predicted and observed choices.
The same draws are kept when predicting labour supply responses to a shock on wages (or a policy
reform). Averaging individual supply responses over a large number of draws provides robust transition
matrices. Con￿dence intervals for elasticities (or labour supply responses to a reform) are obtained by
repetitive random draws of the preference parameters from their estimated distributions and, for each
draw, by applying the calibration procedure.
32Table 11: Labour Supply Elasticities
female male
Change  in  hours
own-wage elasticity 0.391 0.110 0.428 0.368
(0.039) (0.017) (0.065) (0.098)
cross-wage elasticity -0.094 -0.046
(0.014) (0.007)
income elasticity 0.009 -0.004 -0.004 -0.025
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004)
Change  in  participation
own-wage elasticity 0.332 0.096 0.320 0.357
(0.036) (0.014)
cross-wage elasticity -0.065 -0.027
(0.036) (0.008)
income elasticity 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 -0.018
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
Couples
Wage-elasticities  (income  elasticity)  are  calculated  by  predicting  the  change  in  average  worked  hours  of  incrementing




re-estimating the labour supply model under di⁄erent assumptions. The ￿rst sensitivity
analysis simply uses the polar case where nobody takes up the FIS 2001. This boils down
to estimating the labour supply model on the "no MWP policy" counterfactual data. In
a second check, we have jointly estimated labour supply and take-up following Brewer
et al. (2006). Possible underreporting of FIS receipt in the data makes the con￿dence
in this model limited. We obtain a take-up rate of 17% compared to the o¢ cial rate of
around a third. This is, however, the best that could be done with existing data linked to
a tax-bene￿t microsimulation model for Ireland. In all three cases, estimates are slightly
di⁄erent but do not lead to fundamentally di⁄erent results about labour supply adjust-
ment to the reforms (assuming full take-up of the MWP policies), as shown for couples
in Table 12.











Hours full take-up 19.6 19.4 18.7 19.4 18.7 19.4
no take-up 19.5 19.4 18.7 19.4 18.7 19.3
LS+take-up 19.4 19.3 18.5 19.3 18.6 19.2
change in FTE full take-up -1183 -6775 -1183 -6752 -1669
no take-up -1035 -6572 -1035 -6527 -1620
LS+take-up -1134 -6635 -1134 -6597 -1695
Men
Hours full take-up 38.7 38.6 37.8 38.6 37.8 38.5
no take-up 38.7 38.5 37.7 38.5 37.8 38.5
LS+take-up 38.8 38.7 37.8 38.7 37.8 38.6
change in FTE full take-up -1355 -6827 -1355 -6789 -1848
no take-up -1291 -7278 -1291 -7204 -1844
LS+take-up -1160 -7658 -1160 -7603 -1858
Labour  supply  estimates  are  obtained  for  two  polar  cases,  i.e.,  systematic  take-up  (our  baseline  estimates)  and  no  take-up,  and
for  the  joint  estimation  of  labour  supply  and  take-up  decision  ("LS+take-up").  Predictions  of  the  policy  effects  assume  that
reforms  lead  to  full  take-up.  FTE:  full-time  equivalent  (change  in  number  of  FTE  workers  compared  to  no  MWP  scenario).  FIS:
Family  Income  Supplement;  MC:  recommendation  from  the  McCarthy's  report;  WTC:  2003  British  Working  Tax  Credit.
34